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Security, Dividedness and Green Activism in Egypt
By Jihan Zakarriya 1
Abstract
This paper attempts to trace green trends in contemporary political activism in Egypt.
Taking into consideration the long, deep-rooted history of military rule in the country, it examines
the interconnection between the concepts of security and resistance. The paper specifically focuses
on post-2011 grassroots, civil and opposition movements in Egypt, arguing that they share and
adopt green concerns with nonviolent, comprehensive activism that relate and politicize different
forms of environmental, gender, socio-economic, and political violence. In this sense, to fight
patriarchy and the militarization and securitization of public spaces and daily activities in Egypt,
post-revolutionary activists, feminists, and opposition movements adopt a hybrid green
perspective relating to human-environmental equality and wellbeing. They approach the violent
practices of successive 21st-century regimes in Egypt, particularly in the post-2011 era, and
security apparatuses as one systematic strategy of patriarchy and corruption. Such awareness of
the unequal distribution of insecurity and political inclusion offers a deep-level perspective of
inequality among Egyptians, their rights, and their environments.
Keywords: Security, Violence, Green activism, Gender, Bio-politics, Spatial dividedness, Public
space
Introduction: Green Activism, Patriarchy, and Security Violence
“Green politics is an ecological, holistic, and feminist movement that transcends
the old political framework of left versus right. […] It addresses the unjust and
destructive dynamics of patriarchy. Green politics rejects all forms of exploitation
– of nature, individuals, social groups, and countries. It is committed to
nonviolence at all levels” (Capra and Spretnak, 21).
In the above quotation, Fritiof Capra and Charlene Spretnak perceive green politics as a secular,
hybrid, plural, and comprehensive form of activism. It is a process of individual and social
awareness and nonviolent action against all forms of polarization, patriarchy, and injustice. Green
politics is not only an admission of the diversity and equality of human beings and natural
environments but also an objection to any form of abuse or violation of the right to equality of
humans of different genders, cultures, religions, and ethnicities on the one side and humans and
nature on the other. Although green politics targets mainly individual attitudes, Capra and Spretnak
argue that “it calls for social responsibility and a sound, sustainable economic system, one that is
ecological decentralized, equitable and comprised of flexible institutions” (21). Noel Sturgeon
supports Capra and Spretnak that green politics seeks to establish a “post-patriarchal society”
through “the stress on decentralization, participatory democracy, and sustainable economic and
1
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ecological practices” (33). Seen this way, green politics share broad, global concerns with a whole
array of disciplines and issues facing many modern societies including environmental degradation,
injustice, militarization, inequality, and hierarchies. As climate change and environmental
problems escalate worldwide, green politics grow stronger. Nowadays, green parties in Canada,
Scotland, Germany, and other countries are running for parliamentary elections in these countries
and gain increasing support (Derek, 12). Thus, green politics support feminist, political, and
environmental causes calling for gender-religion-class and ethnic unbiases and justices. In addition
to this, with the Coronavirus pandemic in the background, green politics not only aims at wider
political manifestations concerning environmental hygiene and sustainability, but also arouses
serious inquiries concerning justice, equality, and humanitarian-ethical attitudes among genders,
ethnicities, and poor and rich classes, and countries.
Green concerns with the interdependence between human and environmental abuse on the
one side and resistance against organized unequal distribution of natural resources, authoritarian
rule, securitized spaces and censored access to public spaces is relevant to 21st-century Egypt. On
25 January 2011, the annual Police Holiday in Egypt, protesters spread all over public areas in
Cairo and all Egyptian cities and governorates calling for “social justice, freedom and an end of
police brutality and the emergency law” (Birnbaum, 1). Egyptian 2011 revolution aims at a
decentralized economy, democratic transition, and healthy human and environmental conditions.
From 2011 to the present, grassroots movements such as 6 April, Enough, Tamarod, and the
National Association for Change, human rights movements such as the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights, and El Nadeem Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of
Violence and Torture, and feminist movements such as anti-Sexual Harassment, I Saw
Harassment, Tahrir Bodyguard, #MeToo and #assaultpolice succeed in mobilizing for legal and
public action against patriarchal and authoritarian practices of Hosni Mubarak (1980-2011),
SCAF: the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (2011-2012), Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013) and
Abdel-Fatah el-Sisi (2014- ). The unifying, customary enemy that faces Egyptian activists under
such different regimes is a very influential, legalized, organized security state. In 1981, President
Mubarak introduces the Emergency Law, still in effect till the present, that legalizes and
normalizes the militarization and securitization of private and public spaces in Egypt. The police,
the military, and the General National Intelligence utilize the Emergency Law to use exceptional
measures to oppress, arrest and torture opposition political parties, individuals, and normal people.
Gradually, mass arrests, incommunicado, sexual violations, and prolonged detentions without trial
and torture are common in Egyptian police stations and prisons (Reza, 535). In this sense, Egyptian
activists fight what Michael Foucault calls “bio-politics.” In Security, Territory,
Population, Foucault argues that “basic biological features of the human species become the object
of a political strategy and security” (16). For Foucault, all modern political regimes seek to
discipline and control the physical and cultural qualities and attitudes of their communities and
individuals. So, the concept of security develops from the regulation of and sovereignty over
territorial boundaries to the regulation and control of population and natural resources. Thus,
representatives of authority not only employ “the individual as a particular way of dividing up the
multiplicity,” but also “milieu becomes the determining factor of nature” (17). In revolutionary
Egypt, Paul Amar describes bio-politics in the following way:
The SCAF preserved the essence of Mubarak’s Emergency Decree, reinvigorated
the military court system to arrest and try civilians, and extended the repressive
power of its class-and sexuality-driven logic of domination. Many of those detained
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were young, male, working-class labor protesters whom the armed forces identified
not as political dissenters with rights but as thugs (baltagiya) or fags (khawaliya).
… They detained women protesters and administered “virginity tests,” hymen
inspections that are of course forms of molestation or rape in themselves. (3)
As explained by Amar, bio-political patriarchy and violence in Egypt are methodical and
anti-green. Security apparatuses and the military coercively dominate and control public spaces
and human bodies. Police violence in the post-2011 era includes security chaos, dangerous public
spaces, coercive disappearance of protesters and activists, murder, organized sexual attacks,
violent arrests, and torture in prisons (Kingsley 2014; Grove 2015 and Tadros 2015). Such violent
practices circulate sexist, classist, and divisive. To begin with, female protesters are seen as
“whores whose public presence was an attack on national honor,” while working-class protesters
“defiled national dignity and insulted the army” (Amar, 3). To further punish protesters, security
agents make protest spaces and surrounding environments unhealthy, unsafe, and hostile. They
destroy the green space in Tahir Square and the neighborhood and build an elaborate system of
walls and barbed-wire roadblocks to ward off demonstrators. Security agents assault medical
personnel and prevent medical supplies from accessing protest spaces. (Malsin, 1). Gradually,
public opposition, activists, and human rights figures are defamed in the media. For instance,
Mohamed ElBaradei, the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is accused
of “facilitating American invasion of Iraq” and as “being westernized” (Amnesty International
2016). Members of the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Hisham Mubarak Law
Center (HMLC), and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) are persistently accused of
receiving “funds from foreign countries and as disturbing stability in Egypt” (Amnesty
International 2016). Finally, the military utilizes the divisions and the disagreements among
revolutionary groups and the failure of the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi to unify all
Egyptians or to gain their trust. Again, Egypt’s home security is propagated as disciplining and
regulating chaotic protesters, and violent Islamists. Furthermore, the ability of the military and the
deep state to grip on power in revolutionary Egypt reflects the complexity and interdependence of
domestic, regional, and globalized security interests and deals. For instance, the military warns
Egyptians of the disturbing, unusual security conditions in the area ranging from civil wars in
Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the emergence of ISIS, and ethnic, sectarian conflicts in Iraq and
Lebanon. The growth of populist regimes in the West and the support of authoritarian Gulf
countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates empower the Egyptian military as
well. Paul Carnegie explains that:
The Egyptian military is still Washington’s favored institution for holding onto
Egypt and maintaining a regional status quo conducive to its interests and that of
local and global capital. There has been little change in the form of government.
The el-Sisi ‘military junta’ represents little more than the continuation of
Mubarak’s so-called civilian administration. (45)
Carnegie underscores the fact that globalized economic and security management limits
the Egyptian protesters’ ability to reform the security sector. As Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seizes power,
he leads extensive, unprecedented crackdown on the opposition, grassroots, and civil movements,
including those who support el-Sisi’s coup against Morsi. For instance, 2011 youth such as Ahmed
Maher, Mohammed Adel, Ahmed Douma, Israa Abdel Fattah, Mona Seif, Asmaa Mahfouz, Shady
Harb, and others (Egypt: largest wave 2019, 1). Revolutionary, independent, and free thinkers and
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activists such as Amer Hamzawi, Alaa el-Aswani, Khalid Yusuf, Choukri Fishere, and others are
forced to leave Egypt. The European Parliament’s report on human rights in Egypt (2015) states
that “more than 22,000 people have been detained since 2013” (2). In 2013, Protest Law 107
restricts giving the Interior Minister the right to “cancel, postpone or move the protest. Violators
of the law face hefty prison sentences and fines” (Jeannerod, 1 and Darwish, 1). Sexual violence
against women in public spaces continues so that in 2014-2015, 1964 cases of public sexual
harassment and assault were reported. In 2014, a new parliamentary law was passed and in 2018
referendum was passed to extend the President’s term and his power in the selection and control
of the judiciary, as well as the reorganization of the legislative branch (Roll and Miehe, 1). In 2017,
Law 70 is issued to control non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In 2016, el-Sisi issues a law
that enables him to dismiss Hisham Geneina, the head of the Egyptian Central Auditing
Organization. Geneina states that he had “discovered corruption above 600 billion Egyptian
pounds (about $ 70 billion) in 2015 alone” (Reuters 2016). El-Sisi’s dismissal of Geneina is met
with disapproval from the judicial sector and wider sectors of civil society, but security oppression
silences all.
Seen this way, bio-political violence in contemporary Egypt upholds a narrative of chaotic,
divisive, and unsafe public spaces, a narrative that contrasted with the first experience of 2011
Tahrir Square and protests spaces as optimistic, inclusive, and secure. The extreme use of the
Emergency Law and police power in revolutionary Egypt and the high levels of corruption in
private and governmental sectors further frustrate and frighten many Egyptians from public revolt.
In the forthcoming analysis, I aim at achieving two goals. Firstly, I examine how bio-politics in
Egypt affects civil spaces and relationships among different classes and genders. I specifically
focus on urban dividedness and spatial insecurity. Secondly, I trace how post-2011 activism
exemplifies and is informed by different characteristics of green politics. It focuses specifically on
access to public spaces, class-gender-religious integrity, and nonviolent interference in the
decision-making processes in Egypt.
Eco-human Inequalities and Divisions in 21st-century Egypt: Systematic Socio-economic
Violence
The constant securitization and militarization of Egyptian politics produce massive
inequalities and abuses concerning the distribution of wealth, resources, services, and sustained
ecosystems in the country. Jessica Winegar tackles aspects of poverty and spatial segregation in
Egypt from an urban security perspective arguing that:
As the 1990s and 2000s wore on, Cairenes griped not only about the trash but also
about the filth and disrepair of public spaces such as squares, parks, bus stops,
government offices, and schools. As state welfare policy shifted its focus from the
poor to the rich, urban space became extremely segregated and militarized. Many
with the means moved out of what they viewed as the “chaos” of mixed- or lowerclass areas of Cairo into gated communities or other secluded areas with private
security systems. (Winegar 32)
The urbanization and modernization processes in Egypt are class-oriented. While affluent and rich
classes and areas enjoy full state protection, healthy environments, and administrative care, poor
classes lack basic services and are perceived as dangerous and criminal. Moreover, affordable
public spaces of socialization such as parks and open, green spaces are neglected and militarized
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(Abul-Magd, 30). Urban and public spaces in Cairo are intentionally designed and administered to
control and limit human bodies, particularly women’s bodies, through marginalization, violence,
and insecurity that all entail fear of public spaces. There are no walking spaces in Egyptian streets
and walking spaces are either destroyed or unmaintained. In Environmental Problems in Third
World Cities, Jorge Hardoy, Diana Mitlin, and David Satterthwaite underscore the fact that urban
development in Egypt has serious socio-economic and environmental drawbacks since:
“more than 10 percent of the nation’s most productive farmland has been lost to
urban encroachment in the last three decades, much of it through illegal squatting
or sub-division while the same time prime sites within cities remain
underdeveloped” (5).
As “the poor are confined in the worst located and most dangerous areas and slums,” Hardoy,
Mitlin, and Satterthwaite continue, “the most serious environmental problems are largely confined
to poorer groups” (5). Likewise, M. Davis traces that “the 39.9% (11.8 million) of the urban
population in Egypt [who] live in slums suffer from problems in the accessibility, high residential
densities, deteriorated infrastructure, lack of services and the absence of open spaces” (3). Slums
are often not recognized and addressed by the public authorities as an integral part of the city (UNHabitat 6). Moreover, the lack of basic services in slums results in the decline of the built and
natural environments (Ali and Suleiman, 2006). In 2010, Egypt experiences an environmentally
and health-threatening rubbish crisis as piles of rubbish spread all over Egyptian streets and the
government fails to address the problem properly (Fahmi and Sutton 1766). Because of pervasive
pollution, poor Egyptians suffer from long-term illnesses like kidney failure, cancer, or the
Hepatitis C Virus (20%-10% of the population) and high and increasing rates of renal diseases and
renal failure: roughly 30% of which are caused by Schistosomiasis, lack of safe drinking water
and insufficient sewage treatment infrastructure (Wolfe and Abu-Raddad, 14757; Mahmoud et al,
2013).
The harmful influence of slums and impoverished areas, poor housing, and environmental
conditions on the psychological and behavioral features of their inhabitants, particularly
concerning women, arouses a variety of studies and inquiries. In Slums, Violence and Health,
Silvia de Weerdt argues persuasively that “since poverty, overcrowding, lack hygiene, and basic
human services, ill-health and governmental negligence are main characteristics of slums
worldwide, aspects of inter-personal violence and insecurity increase” (2). Women are the prime
victims of insecurity and sexual violence. In Dealing with Slums in Egypt, Sylvia Habib echoes
Weerdt that residents of slums and poor areas in Egypt,
“feel insecure as a result of the isolation from other neighborhoods of the area along
with the absence of a police station and the negligence of the authorities to the
region which resulted in the prevalence of bullying and violence in the area. [...]
There are a lot of drug dealers and gangs in some of these areas” (73).
Habib underscores further that slum residents suffer “negative impression the people outside the
area got about them [due to] high levels of drugs and crimes in their areas” (73). Thus, slums and
poor areas not only suffer systematic governmental negligence and abuse but also become a source
of danger and insecurity to surrounding areas, specifically to women and to their peaceful
inhabitants. They feel abandoned and inferiorized. Slums and poor and neglected areas in Egypt
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have been the target of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist groups who dominate the civil society
and shape culture. Islamists not only offer social services to many poor and marginalized
communities but also propose themselves as a reliable substitute to the corrupt, unfair government.
Nevertheless, Islamist President Morsi does not exert any real effort to improve living and
environmental conditions in slums and poor areas. Likewise, in 2020, the Egyptian government
takes sudden decisions that disturb slum dwellers and poor areas by ordering “the demolition of
houses constructed illegally inside cities or on farmland with tens of thousands of people are losing
their homes, especially with state authorities failing to offer them alternatives” (Egypt: Thousands
at risk, 1). The government justifies its decisions that “between 2000 and 2017, around 2 million
construction violations were committed in different parts of Egypt, and that Egypt has also lost
over 12 percent of its nine million acres of farmland to the same violations” (Amin, 1). Egyptian
government and authorities do not tell about or punish those who cause such high levels of
corruption. Again, poor classes, rural people, and the ecosystem suffer.
In addition to this, securitized, authoritarian regimes in Egypt not only neglect the
deteriorating, unhealthy, and unsafe life in slums and poor areas in Egypt but also Historic Cairo
and major tourist attractions lack necessary maintenance and care and are unspeakably damaged
and exploited by looters and corrupt security agents who vandalize the Egyptian Museum and
other tourist sites they are supposed to protect and guard (Parcak et al. 2016; Fradley el al.
2017). Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index 2015 announces that “Egypt, the 83rd in the
global ranking and 10th in the region, has experienced safety and security concerns and
infrastructure limitations” (18). In this way, the prioritization of security measures and the
relegation of human and ecological wellbeing to secondary positions, all related to securitized and
militarized political-economic structures in Egypt, that negatively affect Egyptian integrity,
administrative effectiveness, and (international) accountability, particularly about women’s rights
and environmental sustainability. The dominant urban planning of segregated and secluded areas
and communities in Egypt not only reflect the exclusive, class-oriented production and circulation
of power in the country but also discriminatorily organize the relationship between the different
classes, environments, and individuals and determine the habits, health hazards, norms,
expectations, ecosystems, and images in mass media. The authoritarian rule and the security state
in Egypt are anti-green politics and thinking. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the
emergence of green trends and concerns within post-2011 activism in Egypt.
Green Activism in Post-2011 Egypt
In relation to the above-mentioned analysis of human and environmental neglect and the
violence of the security state in Egypt, this part of the paper identifies three aspects of post-2011
activism in Egypt as green. Firstly, in their fight against the persistently brutal and privileged
security state, post-2011 activists in Egypt show great solidarity and ability for effective, collective
mobilization and environmentally aware practices in public spaces. During all protests, rallies, and
in sleeping tents and places built in Tahrir Square and other protest spaces, Egyptian protesters of
all socioeconomic, religious, political, and gender backgrounds securely gather exemplifying what
Douglas Torgerson calls “green citizen” who is “a political actor, who indeed acts with functional
and constitutive ends in view, but who also engages in political performance” (23). Green citizens,
Torgerson continues, balance between “the personal responsibility of the individual” and “the
systematic patterns of incentives, structured principally through the administrative sphere that
serve to shape and direct the behavior of the possessive individual” (23). During the 2011
revolution, Egyptians’ solidarity in protest spaces reflects the intersections of hybrid and plural
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aspects of shared vulnerability to patriarchy including police violence, socio-economic
inequalities, health, and environmental problems, and lack of freedom of speech, all administered
by the military rule and police state. Although Egyptian protesters seek different incentives of
freedom, justice, respectable economic income, and health care, they develop a collective green
awareness of their responsibility towards their spaces and nature. Jessica Winegar comments on
Egyptians’ practices in public spaces as follows:
The revolution enabled [Egyptians] to break the fear of the security forces. Perhaps
for the first time in their lives, they could work, laugh, and play together in public
space without an overwhelming sense of state surveillance or upper-class disgust.
They were trying to reverse and reject, the neglect of the Mubarak government by
taking the repair and beautification of the city into their own hands. (33-34)
Winegar refers specifically to Egyptian people’s strong physical existence in public spaces as a
direct challenge to state power. They are not afraid and do not care about police violence, torture,
or even murder. Moreover, environmentally-friendly campaigns such as Tahrir Beautification Day
and Let’s Clean that clean the Tahrir square and surrounding areas are a declaration of people’s
ability for sound administration and for making decisions on behalf of their corrupt government.
Ali Abdel Mohsen explains how environmental activism in 21st-century Egypt has played an
important role in effecting sustained progress and environmental justice tackling the pressing
issues of climate change, pollution, and mountains of trash in streets, overflowing sewers, and lack
of services in poor areas (1). Mohsen mentions pre-2011 environmental initiatives for recycling
and clean life that spread in different Cairene neighborhoods and online platforms, and how such
campaigns raise awareness of serious health and ecological hazards in Egypt (1). Elliott Woods
supports Mohsen that environmental activism plays important role in advocating equal ecological
and human rights in Egypt. Woods regards Egyptians “picking up trash, painting curbs, and
adorning light posts and tree trunks with the colors of the Egyptian flag [as] they were finally
taking ownership of their capital and their country […] They were washing away corruption”
(110). In this sense, decorating dirty, old walls with graffiti and cleaning streets are also acts of
fighting negative feelings of uncertainty and temporality. Egyptians have experienced very long
years of repression and silencing that talking publically about politics becomes taboo. So, Egyptian
protesters’ spatial freedom and domination are a battle against time. They want to claim a
permanent position of power. Protesters form self-sufficient communities in public spaces with
specialized groups for medical help, food supplies, blankets and beds, and clean clothes and toilets
(Biggs, 1). Practices of mutual care and sanitation, necessary to sustain bodies and surrounding
environments in Tahrir square and protest spaces and to continue the struggle, are definitely acts
of green awareness. Protesters show care towards their national and cultural heritage as well. They
form a human chain to protect the priceless artifacts within the Egyptian National Museum
(Halime, 2012, 1).
Moreover, civil, human rights, and grassroots movements compete with the Muslim
Brotherhood and Islamists in offering help and services for slums and poor and marginalized areas
in Egypt. They also offer new cultural and social services and ideas concerning gender equality,
political responsibility, and environmental-health awareness. Consequently, residents of slums,
rural and poor areas are encouraged to effectively participate in political change. In 2011, famous
Egyptian actor and director Mohamed Sobhi initiates “Together for Developing Slums” as a nonprofit organization that aims to raise funds to “elevate slum-dwellers” standard of living, and grant
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them an integrated decent life, where they have an access to individuals’ basic needs, such as
education, health care, security, and livelihood” (el-Henawy and Shawki 1). Young slum girls
between the ages of 10 to 15 appear in media stating that “our campaign is political. We ask the
state to protect from drug dealers and criminals that hide in our areas and to help us lead a decent
and safe life” (el-Ebrashy). The fact that young, marginalized poor societies, particularly girls, are
given a voice and that they dare to face the public and authorities asking for their rights as equal
human beings show they gain a space of responsibility and action and could share a common
democratic dream with Egyptians. They reuse the public and urban spaces not only to expose state
hypocrisy and its pervading media-image of youth as either passive recipients or elements of chaos,
but also to generate plural settings and meanings in opposition to oppression, socio-spatial
segregation, emergency law, and ugliness. Tamarod is one of the most famous, nonviolent, and
successful movements in post-2011-revolutionary Egypt that reflect the success of the civil society
in effecting wide public change and support. Founded in 2013 by young Egyptian activists in
opposition to Islamist President Mohamed Morsi’s temporary constitution declaration that gives
him the unlimited power to legislate without judicial review, Tamarod gathers 22 million
signatures, a more than enough number to call for early presidential elections. Tamarod plays a
significant role in legalizing the ousting of President Morsi. Julia Elyachar argues that “Tamarod
rendered visible, and upended for political goals, a social infrastructure of communicative channels
in Egypt” and thus represent “agency as distributed, dialogic, and historically constituted” (453).
For Elyachar, Tamarod cleverly introduces new political symbols of action by utilizing a “multilayered infrastructure of communicative channels with skill and tenacity such as mobile phones,
Internet services, social media, visits, gossip, and socializing” (465). Tamarod innovatively and
courageously mobilizes for public participation and gains international respect and support for
their nonviolent, democratic plan of action. So, even though Tamarod’s democratic plan is not
fully accomplished and the military re-takes power in Egypt, Tamarod’s access to public spaces
and success in organizing and raising awareness for action promises real change in collective
conscience in Egypt. In 2019 and 2020, and despite el-Sisi’s unprecedented oppression and police
violence, people in slums, poor neighborhoods, and the marginalized and neglected countryside
organize anti-el-Sisi protests. They overcome their fears and are aware of their rights (Hamad
2020, al-Anani 2020).
Secondly, post-2011 activism shows a green awareness of gender violence and
marginalization as political problems rather than the traditional view that they are women’s issues.
In Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street, Judith Butler underscores two important aspects
of the revolutionary demonstrations in Tahrir square. The first is:
“a certain sociability was established within the square, a division of labor that
broke down gender difference that involved rotating who would speak and who
would clean the areas, developing a work schedule for everyone to maintain the
environment” (77).
For Butler, the methodological and equal division of work, responsibility, and leadership among
male and female protesters develops “horizontal relations” that challenge established cultural,
political and economic hierarchies. The second aspect is:
“the collective chant of the word “silmiyya” (peace, nonviolence) as a way of
encouraging people to resist the mimetic pull of military aggression – and the
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aggression of the gangs – by keeping in mind the larger goal – radical democratic
change” (78).
Butler emphasizes that Egyptian protesters express the patience, determination, and geographical
expansion needed to realize the revolution and not to be distracted by useless fights or violence. I
agree with Butler that since the 2011 revolution to the present, Egyptian women are constantly
credited and appreciated for their sacrifices, courage, and significant participation in all political
events, elections, and socio-cultural debates. Female protesters are murdered, arrested, and
imprisoned like their male counterparts. Moreover, Egyptian women experience systematic,
organized, and state-sponsored acts of public sexual violence and rape as a political weapon of
defaming and frightening female activists and their families of accessing protest spaces. Women
in Tahrir Square and surrounding areas are constantly harassed and sometimes raped by
unidentified mobs and by members of the security forces. In many cases, police and military
stationed in these areas did not prevent the mob attacks (Tadros, 1351; Sorbera 69). Yet, Egyptian
women resist and do not retreat from protest and public spaces. Rather, Egyptian women’s equal
and acknowledged public political roles develop their green activism for establishing real genderecological ethics placing sexual and gender-based violence as a health and human rights concern
in the country. Gill Valentine argues that:
The public blame of victims who were in public places, for being in a dangerous or
inappropriate place when they were attacked, encourages all women to transfer
their threat appraisal from men to certain public spaces. Fear of being in public
space is for women to adopt false assumptions about their security. […] Mental
maps of feared environments elaborated by images gained from hearing the
frightening experiences and advice of others; and from media reporting. (386)
Valentine explains how patriarchal and authoritarian societies and regimes use media to
devilize and deform the relationship between humans in general, and women in particular, and
environment and nature, including built and public spaces, for repressive security aims. Since the
beginning of the 21st-century to the present time, Egyptian women experience systematic practices
of slow public violence. The pervasive, unevenly distributed, and chaotic nature of public,
gendered violence over space and time causes high levels of unpredictability, anxiety, and alertness
among Egyptian women who not only internalize a culture of fear and vulnerability, particularly
in public spaces but also that the male perpetrators and the state as unaccountable and irresponsible.
So, women have to seclude and stay home to feel secure. Nonetheless, in post-2011 Egypt, female
public activism and their stereotypical security perceptions change as women’s real contacts with
different and diverse male and female agents and groups in public spaces counter traditional state
and media narratives about public spaces as dangerous for women. For instance, during the first
18 days of the Egyptian revolution, no single case of sexual violence is reported and female
protesters declare that “men were not touching women; in fact, they were saying sorry every time
they bumped into a woman” (Biggs, 1). Women’s positive experiences in revolutionary public
spaces, Sylviane Aacinski argues, “partially destroy the old framework of political life, pushing it
onto the stage of media communication” (130). Eventually, the emerging gender-ecological
activism wins the media scene. Awareness campaigns of women’s rights for a secure public
appearance and how individuals and groups ought to behave with each other and with the
environment become consistent and common. The political-ecological causes and factors of
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gender violence are explicitly discussed, rendering socio-cultural stereotypes that blame the female
victims invalid. Civil male and female members of anti-sexual harassment movements and
initiatives exist in public spaces and interfere to protect female protesters. The shortages of existing
harassment laws are openly discussed in social media, pamphlets, online blogs and sites, TV
programs, and public speeches by common people and public figures (Flock, 2-3 and Zakarriya,
127).
Providing women with safe means and platforms to tell their stories and to document the
sexual attacks help them overcome feelings of shame and fear related to sexual violations. Such
informal social controls and interferences in public areas gain protesters, particularly women,
credibility and trust and endorses civil potential intervention in the decision-making processes.
Moreover, the widespread use of public and private cameras, usually used for policing Egypt, to
document cases of sexual violence and to catch the attackers is a new, practical approach to
examine and watch public spaces. Egyptians are documenting, supervising, and holding
accountable the state, its security members, and perpetrators of sexual and gendered violent acts.
The factual, visual, and online documentation of sexual, spatial and gender violations and violence
maintains updated information and knowledge and pressure authorities and decision-makers to act.
For example, Presidents Morsi, and el-Sisi criminalize sexual harassment and rape, and new
harassment laws are introduced and more women are encouraged to report their experiences of
sexual violence. Inspired by the international #MeToo, Egyptian #metoo, and #assaultpolice, for
example, achieve a great legal, socio-cultural, and political development through documenting and
exposing cases of sexual violence and rape committed by upper-class, wealthy, and powerful men
including Ahmed Bassam Zaki, AUC student and the son of a powerful and wealthy family, who
has been coercively assaulting, harassing, and raping his female colleagues is arrested and is under
trial. The Fairmont Hotel Group Rape was committed by a group of wealthy and powerful men
who used to drug and rape women are caught. A poor rural girl called Farah, who is raped by two
powerful brothers in her village, appears in the media and tells her stories. Farah’s rapists are
caught and tried (Salah 2020; Tarek 2020). Sexual violence in Egypt is not just seen as stemming
from cultural or social sexist ideas or problems, but as a political problem as well. Egyptian women
realize that power and immunity beget sexual abuse. Consequently, Egyptian women’s activism
against sexual violence is political activism. They defend their rights for equal and safe access to
public spaces.
Finally, post-2011 grassroots, feminist, and opposition activism and movements are
characterized by national and globalized green integrity and resilience against all forms of
violence. Egyptian resistance movements adopt green thinking of security that exceeds narrow
conceptions of war, military power, national security, terrorism, security state, and police brutality.
Rather, they embrace a wider, ecological attitude towards security in Egypt discussing and relating
issues of gendered and class inequalities and violence, repression, individual and collective
security, development as entailing spatial and economic justice and access to services and
resources, decentralized administration, and environmental degradation. Since the early beginning
of the 2011 revolution in Egypt, there are organized visual and written documentation of individual
and collective memory, abuses, and violation that Egyptians go through during the different stages
of the revolution. Reputable and credible human rights, feminist and grassroots organizations, and
movements authenticate violations and acts of violence maintaining a political space of
condemnation and resistance of responsible and complicit regimes and structures (Sorbera, 499;
Zakarriya, 128). The trials of Presidents Mubarak and Morsi give hope of realizing justice for past
and present atrocities in the future. Taking into consideration the fact that the military is valued
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and respected as the defenders of the nation, opposition movements distinguish between corrupt
military men and the military as a protective, national entity. They use precise descriptions and
specific, legal demands. El-Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture
declares that “women’s security is a precondition to a real democratic transition” affirming the
need for “legislation to penalize violence and discriminations against women, seeing that the
Egyptian constitution lacks articles that prohibit discrimination and violence and establishing
equality between men and women in all areas of life”. (4–5). Grassroot thinkers and feminist and
human rights activists persuasively propagate that security in Egypt is related to “empowering
poor and slum dwellers, particularly women, through education and skill development and
appropriate health care to overcome high fertility and crime levels” (Naber and Abd El-Hameed,
525). Nazra for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Arab
Network cooperate to “document state and non-state violence against women in public spaces,
violations against freedom of expression, violations of human and physical rights of political
prisoners and provide legal, medical, and psychological remedies to survivors of violence” (Naber
and Abd El-Hameed, 521-2). They communicate with and exchange knowledge with international
human rights and feminist organizations that watch security violations in Egypt regularly.
In Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon argues that:
“violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen—and deeply
considered—as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources but
also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that ‘the past is never
dead. It’s not even past” (8).
Nixon emphasizes that dictatorial and corrupt regimes permeate landscapes and oppress people
through time exercising measures of slow violence. To refute and resist such eco-human forms of
slow violence, Nixon continues, “resistance may assume not just human forms but also arise from
an unanticipated recalcitrance on the part of a targeted resource, which may prove harder to
commodify and profitably remove or manage than corporate moguls foresaw” (69). For Nixon,
resistance requires patience, insistence, and strategy. In addition to constant documentation of
violations and violence and awareness campaigns of human and security rights, Egyptian activists
utilize current international and national conditions to support their green agenda. On the national
level, el-Sisi faces the emergence of angry opposition in slums and poor areas that defy the image
of the military men as immune to criticism. In 2019, Mohammed Ali, a young Egyptian actor and
a wealthy construction contractor who has been working with the military for 15 years turns against
the regime. Ali posts a series of videos on his social media giving detailed descriptions and naming
senior military officers involved in cases of corruption and wasting billions on luxurious projects
(Videos accusing Egypt's Sisi, 2019). Ali’s videos cause unrest and resentment among lower and
marginalized classes who protest against their injustices who lead protests against el-Sisi asking
for equal economic and social rights. Under extreme security measures and growing popular
resentment concerning inequalities among classes, el-Sisi’s early call for national cohesion and
stability is jeopardized by the exaggerated inequalities, internal displacements by environmental
or economic stress, and human rights violations. Because of pressure from civil society and social
criticism, the Egyptian government takes specific measures to help lower classes in slums. In 2020,
el-Sisi declares an upgrading and national development plan of unsafe and unhealthy slums in
Egypt (Farouk, 1).
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On the international level, green thinking and politics get a boost with the ‘unanticipated’
devastating economic and health effects of the Coronavirus pandemic, the devastating everyday
environmental-human cost of militarism, and the irresponsible use of chemicals and weapons
symbolized in the Beirut Explosion and Trump’s defeat in 2020 Presidential elections, mainly
because he failed to address Coronavirus appropriately. In this sense, Egypt is no exception. There
are public demands of environmental-health sustainability. Despite the restrictions on civil
organizations and activism, Egyptian activists and ordinary people use online platforms such as
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to exchange information and tell their experiences with
coronavirus and public health issues. Some youth use innovative ways such as graffiti to spread
awareness about the corona and preventive practices. Many youth-led initiatives in poor areas
distribute free antiseptics, masks, and gloves (Zaiyada, 1). Youth not only raise awareness
cornering measures that can be followed to prevent the transmission of the disease but also guide
people concerning dealing with their infected neighbors and relatives. Likewise, youth in villages
launch initiatives to sterilize the streets and houses of their villages and to educate people about
public and private hygiene, and the right ways to deal with rubbish. A group of young people
delivers groceries to home for free to protect the elderly. One4All is a civil society initiative to
fight Covid-19 in Egypt. One4All is a partnership between private sector leaders and local health
startups that is helping provide a myriad of services to Egypt’s population free of charge, to help
the population cope and lessen the strain on hospitals (One4All, 1). Furthermore, civil groups and
initiatives put pressure on the government to offer special help to irregular and rural workers who
lost their jobs because of the Corona epidemic. Covid-19 exceptional measures include giving
irregular workers, including women, a monthly allowance of EGP 500 (around USD 32) in cash,
and increasing payments to women community leaders in rural areas from EGP 350 to EGP 900
per month to ensure gender equity. Moreover, the Takaful and Karama social protection programs
expand to include additional 60,000 households, where women already represent 88% of the
programs’ beneficiaries (The Covid-19 Crisis in Egypt, 3-4). As such, the emerging resistance and
pressure of the civil society and ordinary people in Egypt, despite strict restrictions, have great
potential and reflect real green awareness of the interconnections between spatial, gender, and
political violence in the society.
Conclusion
This paper rethinks the relationship between the concepts of the security state and
resistance in contemporary Egypt from a green perspective. It argues that civil and political
activism in post-2011 Egypt is characterized by green trends that fight the militarization of spaces,
economy, and power in Egypt through hybrid, collective, nonviolent actions. Although the military
re-seizes power in 2014, the political and civil map of thought and action has changed in Egypt.
The downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood along with the military leaders’ loss of credibility and
immunity to criticism, propose feminist, civil, and grassroots movements as a credible and
trustworthy substitute. Post-2011 Egyptian resistance explores military complexes, exposes the
unjust and oppressive division of resources, services and rights in Egypt. Many political, social,
and sexual taboos are challenged and refuted in post-2011 Egypt. Activists unite to endorse legal
and practical measures concerning aspects of poor lives in slums, spatial violence and insecurity.
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